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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC #04448-87/2
12 November 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia

SUBJECT: SNIE 56-2-87: Political Crisis in the Philippines:
A National Agenda for Action

1. Attached is the precoordination draft of SNIE 56-2-87: Political Crisis in the Philippines: A National Agenda for Action. It was prepared by [redacted] of the Office East Asian Analysis under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. As this Estimate is on a fast track, I have sent the draft concurrently to the Senior Review Panel for their comments, and to the NFIB Representatives for their review. I plan to coordinate the Estimate on Monday, 16 November 1987.

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2. This Estimate will provide policymakers at the Departments of State and Defense with the unique perspective of what the Intelligence Community believes is necessary to ensure long-term stability in the Philippines and the survival of the Aquino government.

3. During the preparation of the draft I tried to accommodate as many of the Senior Review Panel's concerns as possible. I agree with the SRP that political, social, security and economic concerns are the key factors in the current crisis--and these are addressed at some length in the draft. However, like the DDCI, I believe that Aquino is a central figure to the issue in the Philippine drama and the focus of many questions from policymakers. As a result, I intended this Estimate to focus more on what Aquino, and what her government must do to address long-term fundamental problems facing the Philippines and the linkage between these and Aquino's continued survival in office. I believe that a detailed discussion of the insurgency and other concerns of the SRP are best left to another Estimate.

Carl Ford
Carl W. Ford, Jr.

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC-04230-87
3 November 1987

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
Concept Paper and Terms of Reference (TOR)
for SNIE 56-3-87: Political Crisis in
the Philippines: Implications for the
United States (Fast-Track), internally
dated 27 October 1987

1. The Panel notes the intention of the SNIE to provide US policymakers with "the unique perspective of what Filipinos believe is necessary to ensure long-term stability in the Philippines and the survival of the Aquino government," and to supplement this with an Aquino survival prognosis and an Aquino-as-best-chance analysis.

2. We question whether these alone are a sufficient basis for the SNIE on Philippine prospects that is needed now. The Concept Paper acknowledges this in its statement of the Problem which includes as a first aim to "examine conditions in the Philippines after the 28 August coup." This is one of the SNIE's two most critical requirements--the other is to project those conditions for the several time frames of the exercise: three to six months, 6-12 months, and the next 3-5 years, respectively. The present TOR do not, in our view, provide an adequate basis for these more significant purposes: The first aim is not subsequently referred to; the second is not made explicit.

3. The Panel, in its memo to the DCI and DDCI of 24 September, suggested there are several trends converging to make the prospects for the Philippine government problematic. We felt several factors needed more estimative attention, including especially developments outside Manila, trends in insurgent violence, and political/economic currents. We also noted what we believed to be an overemphasis on the personality and leadership style of Mrs. Aquino. We think these are still valid points which need be taken into account in an updated assessment of the crisis in the Philippines.

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
4. It may be that the managers and drafters of the present project have such matters in mind, but their intentions toward them do not clearly emerge from the present drafts. Without an antecedent and systematic analysis of present and prospective Philippine "conditions," readers will have no basis for judging the rationale of post-coup Philippine perspectives or the adequacy of whatever is posed as "the ideal--or the model--national agenda."


5. We believe the Key Questions continue to be too much personality centered and will not lead to adequate appreciation by policymakers of the broad ranging nature of the Philippine crisis. In fact, we would suggest that the SNIE title might be reconsidered. The crisis is not only political; it is security, economic, social, and, in its implications, international. The Panel suggests that something along the line of the following should be the thrust of the Key Questions and TOR: What are the major forces and currents for stability and instability? Which are the critical threats to internal security and will the central authorities be able to cope with them? How? What are the major sources of insurgent strength? Can the Aquino government counteract the appeal and power of the CPP? How serious are the internal problems? Why is the power of the central authority eroding?

6. Finally, we think the drafts might also address the question of Other Actors/Potential Donors, both friendly (Japan, Korea, ASEAN, perhaps a few West Europeans) and unfriendly (notably a Soviet transmission belt through Vietnam). What are the prospects of Philippine burden-sharing?


William Leonhart


John B. McPherson


Courtland D. Perkins


Richard L. Walker

cc: Acting C/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
VC/NIC (Mr. Fuller)
NIO for East Asia

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